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Increases in computing power within the last decade have
permitted the simulation of viral animal epidemics using stochastic,
discrete-time, spatial models involving tens of thousands of farms.
However, to relate these simulations to actual farm communities,
accurate data are required as to the locations of the farms in the
community and the numbers of animals that each farm contains.
While such data are available in many countries, they are severely
lacking in the United States because of conﬁdentiality and privacy
restrictions.
This study examines avian inﬂuenza (AVI) epidemics within the
state of Pennsylvania. We take Pennsylvania as the spatial extent of
our study because of its large farmed poultry population and because
our research facilities are located in this state. Lacking accurate data as
to the locations and sizes of the poultry farms in Pennsylvania, we
used synthetic geographical data generated by the Research Triangle
Institute (RTI) of North Carolina (Bruhn et al., 2007). RTI's synthetic
data provide an accurate representation of the poultry farms
throughout the United States and are the geographical data we
applied in the analysis of an actual AVI epidemic in 1983–84 in
Pennsylvania (Buisch et al., 1984) that was useful in our present
study.The mathematical model we employ is a stochastic, discrete-time,
spatial model of the type extensively in use since the 2001 foot-and-
mouth epidemic in Great Britain. This type of model has been studied
in detail by Keeling et al. (2001, 2003), Keeling (2005), Keeling and
Eames (2005), Tildesley et al. (2006) and Tildelsley and Keeling
(2008). We modiﬁed such a model to include a transmission kernel,
described in the next section, which contains two parameters that can
be tuned to a particular viral epidemic. These parameters determine
the way in which the probability that an infectious farm will infect a
susceptible farm is dependent on the distance between the two farms.
In addition to the AVI epidemics examined in this paper, our
transmission kernel can model animal epidemics due to foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD), infectious salmon anemia (ISA), Exotic New-
castle disease (END), and other viral animal diseases.
Our choice of model is somewhat dictated by John von Neumann's
advice that the justiﬁcation of a mathematical model is “solely and
precisely that it is expected to work” (von Neumann, 1955). Many
quite elaborate models of animal epidemics have been described and
employed which require a large amount of data to implement; e.g.,
the North American Animal Disease Spread Model (Harvey et al.,
2007). However, our experience has been that such data are
extremely difﬁcult to ﬁnd. Hence, our model contains only two
parameters within it, and we have resisted the temptation to include
more, being reminded of another remark of von Neumann that “With
four parameters I can ﬁt an elephant, and with ﬁve I can make him
wiggle his trunk” (Dyson, 2004). Generally speaking, the more
parameters a mathematical model contains the less reliable it is for
predictive purposes. Von Neumann's point was that for a model with
many parameters it is easy to ﬁnd values of the parameters that ﬁt
given data, but it is unlikely that these parameters will ﬁt future data.
Fig. 1. The probability P(d) vs. the distance d that one infectious bird will infect one
susceptible bird in one time unit for various values of the epidemic parameter ρ.
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strategies for the prevention and control of such epidemics. This
requires models that can correctly predict the future progress of an
ongoing epidemic or accurately describe possible new epidemics.
The effect of the spatial scale used in our model on the
determination of the two model parameters is of particular interest
to us.While it is rare to ﬁnd information as to the locations and sizes of
individual farms in most states, all states provide information about
the numbers of farm animals within individual counties and some also
provide such data for individual ZIP codes. Our study is thus
concentrated on the ability of our model to accurately describe
epidemics when data are available on the farm, ZIP-code, or county
levels. We thus ﬁrst simulate control epidemics on the farm level and
examine the consequences of having only data as to which ZIP codes
or counties have been infected during the course of the epidemic,
rather than which individual farms were infected.
Our model
AVI epidemics are typically modeled as SEIR epidemics in which
each bird is either never infected or passes through four successive
stages: Susceptible, Exposed (or latent), Infectious, and Recovered. In
the latent stage a bird is asymptomatic and not infectious. In the
recovered stage a bird has either physically recovered from the
disease, died from it, or been culled. In any case, once recovered a bird
cannot become susceptible again. In our model we lump all of the
birds in each of our spatial units (farm, ZIP code, or county) into a
single point whose size is the number of individual birds in the spatial
unit. The location of the point on the farm level is given by the farm
coordinates as provided by Bruhn et al. (2007); for the ZIP-code level
it is the centroid of each ZIP-code region; and for the county level it is
the centroid of each county. The centroids for the ZIP codes and
counties were determined using ArcGIS™, a geographical information
systems software package.
The durations of the latent and infectious stages are dependent on
the spatial unit used. The epidemic within a spatial unit is a small-
scale version of the entire epidemic, so the durations that we assign in
our model to the latent and infectious stages represent discrete
approximations to intervals during which ﬁrst the exposed birds
dominate the spatial unit and then the infectious birds dominate the
spatial unit. Consequently, the durations of these stages increase as
the size of the underlying spatial units increases.
A key assumption of our model is that the probability that an
infectious bird in one unit will infect a susceptible bird in another unit
(and hence all of the birds in that unit) in one discrete time step is a
function only of the straight-line distance between the units.
Consequently, let us denote by p(d) the probability that one infectious
bird will not infect one susceptible bird a distance dmiles in one time
step. As is common in mathematical modeling of epidemics, we shall
work with the transmission kernel K(d) rather than the probability
function p(d), where the connection between the two is given by
K dð Þ = − ln p dð Þð Þ: ð1Þ
One approach to the determination of K(d) is to generate its values for
a large set of discrete values of d using maximum likelihood
estimation on data from a known epidemic (e.g., Keeling et al.,
2001). However, our approach is to assume a certain mathematical
form for K(d) that contains a few parameters and then ﬁnd the
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters using data from a
known epidemic.
To determine a suitable form for K(d), we ﬁrst assume that the
probability function p(d) monotonically decreases from one to zero as
d goes from zero to inﬁnity, so the transmission kernel should
monotonically decrease from inﬁnity to zero as d goes from zero to
inﬁnity. The simplest algebraic function with this behavior is amultiple of an inverse power of d. Such power-law functions are the
most commonly used functions in modeling theory having the
properties we desire (Clauset et al., 2009; Newman, 2005). Accord-
ingly, we chose the following power-law function for K(d):
K dð Þ = δ
d
 ρ
: ð2Þ
This transmission kernel contains two positive parameters δ and ρ
that can be chosen to ﬁt the data from an actual epidemic.
The probability P(d) that one bird will infect another bird a
distance d away is given by
P dð Þ = 1−e
−ð δdÞρ ; ð3Þ
and Fig. 1 displays the graphs of P(d) vs. d for various values of the
parameter ρ. The parameter δ is a distance-scaling factor; speciﬁcally, it
is thedistance atwhich theprobability of infection is 1−1/e=0.6321…
for any value of the parameter ρ. The value of ρ determines how quickly
the transition from one to zero takes place. A small value of ρ leads to a
gradual transition, while a large value leads to a sudden transition at a
distance δ.
The next step is to concentrate many birds into a single spatial unit
(a farm, ZIP code, or county) and determine the probability that an
infectious unit will infect a susceptible unit in one time step. Suppose
the ith unit is infectious and contains Ni birds and the jth unit is
susceptible and contains Nj birds. Then if dij is the distance between
the two units, the probability that no infectious bird in the ith unit will
infect any bird in the jth unit is given by
pij δ; ρð Þ = exp −NiNj
δ
dij
 !ρ !
: ð4Þ
This result assumes that infectious birds infect susceptible birds
independently of each other.
Finally we take into account all units that are infectious in a
particular time step and determine the probability that none of the
birds in the infectious units will infect any of the birds in a speciﬁed
susceptible unit during that time step. If we let A(k) be the set of
indices of those units that are infectious at the beginning of the kth
time step of the epidemic, then
Pjk δ;ρð Þ = 1− ∏
i∈A kð Þ
exp −NiNj
δ
dij
 !ρ !
ð5Þ
is the probability that the jth unit (if susceptible) will be infected
during that time step. Eq. (5) is the basic formula from which we
wrote a MATLAB™ program that simulates an epidemic.
Fig. 2. The 7043 poultry farm in Pennsylvania with the index farm denoted by the white disk.
Fig. 3. Left: The 805 (out of 2190) ZIP codes in Pennsylvania that contain poultry farms, with an average of 69,499 birds per ZIP code. Center: The centroid of each ZIP code indicated
with black disks of three size ranges (small/medium/large number of birds) and the index ZIP code indicated with a white disk. In the background are the 7043 poultry farms. Right:
The centroids of the ZIP codes by themselves with the index ZIP code as a white disk.
63C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70On the farm level we ran our model using a 1-day time step and
took the latent period to be 5 days based on data from the 1983–84
Pennsylvania AVI epidemic (Buisch et al., 1984). As to the duration of
the infectious period, we considered the situation in which farms are
culled once they are determined to be infectious, and 7 days was the
average time from detection to culling at the farm level in the 1983–
84 AVI epidemic in Pennsylvania (Buisch et al., 1984).
On the ZIP-code level and county levels we experimented with
different time steps and different latent and infectious periods to ﬁnd
appropriate values. Because our model calls for each spatial unit to be
in the same SEIR state over each time step, we considered the latent
period to be that period when a sufﬁciently large fraction of the farms
in a typical spatial unit have been infected. Accordingly, we examined
the growth and decay of the number of farms in the latent state in a
typical ZIP code or county over the 1000 control epidemics and
decided that a 10-day latent period was appropriate for both the ZIP-Fig. 4. Left: The 67 counties of Pennsylvania, all of which contain at least one farm, with ave
indicating three size ranges (small/medium/large). In the background are the 7043 poultr
centroid as a white disk.code and county levels. Similarly analyzing the growth and decay of
the number of farms in the infectious stage, we chose a 15-day
infectious period on the ZIP-code level and a 20-day infectious period
on the county level.
While a time-step of 1 day is appropriate on the farm level, it is too
short for the ZIP-code and county levels. One-day time steps for the
ZIP and county levels resulted in epidemics that spread too quickly.
We chose time steps that yielded epidemics generated through our
model that peaked at roughly the same time as our 1000 control
epidemics that were generated on the farm level. We also chose time
steps on the ZIP-code and county levels that were commensurate with
the latent and infectious period on the corresponding level. In
particular, a 5-day time step on the ZIP-code level and a 10-day
time step on the county level resulted in epidemics whose gross
behavior matched the behavior of the 1000 control epidemics fairly
well.rage of 835,030 birds per county. Center: The centroid of each county with black disks
y farms. Right: The centroids of the 67 counties by themselves with the index-county
Fig. 5. Close-up view of some of the ZIP codes regions in Pennsylvania with each
centroid indicated by a dot.
Fig. 6. Attack rates of the fraction of birds infected over 1000 sim
64 C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70Geographical data
The geographical information needed to run our simulations is
displayed in Fig. 2. This synthetic map shows 7043 farms in
Pennsylvania as determined by the Research Triangle Institute
(Bruhn et al., 2007). RTI also generated estimates for the number of
birds on each of the farms, the total number of birds for the state being
about 56 million with an average of 7944 birds per farm. For our
control simulations we took one of these farms, as indicated by the
large disk, as the index farm: the farm that is initially infected and
begins the epidemic. This farm is a fairly large one located in the
southeastern portion of the state where there is a large concentration
of poultry farms.
The left map in Fig. 3 displays the 805 ZIP codes in Pennsylvania
that contain any of the 7043 farms, an average of 69,499 birds per ZIP
code. The ZIP code that contains the index farm is shown in black.
There are a total of 2190 ZIP codes in Pennsylvania, but most of them
are quite small, metropolitan ZIP codes that contain no poultry farms
(e.g., Philadelphia and Pittsburgh). They are located in the white
regions in Fig. 3 andwe have not drawn their boundaries. In the center
map in Fig. 3 we have drawn a disk at the centroid of each of the 805
ZIP codes and shown the 7043 farms in gray in the background. In the
right map we show only the 805 centroid disks with the index ZIP-
code centroid drawn as a white disk and the other centroids drawnulated control epidemics on the three different spatial levels.
65C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70with three different radii to indicate an arbitrary classiﬁcation of the
number of birds in each ZIP code as small, medium, or large.
Fig. 4 shows the 67 counties of Pennsylvania, all of which contain
at least one poultry farm, with the county containing the index farm in
black. There is an average of 835,030 birds per county. The center map
displays the farms as small gray dots and the centroids of the 67
counties are shown as black disks of three different radii. The right
map shows only the 67 centroid disks with the index county as a
white circle.
The 67 counties are not too unusual in shape and the distance
between any two county centroids can be regarded as a reasonable
measure of what we might consider as the “distance” between the
two corresponding counties, and hence the distances dij that we
would use in our formulas. However, some of the ZIP codes in
Pennsylvania have rather unusual shapes. Fig. 5 shows the detail of a
few of the ZIP codes showing how, in some cases, the centroid of a ZIP
code lies outside of the ZIP code and how, in some cases, one ZIP code
is completely contained within another. Nevertheless, since there are
fewer than 9 farms on average in each zip code, the network of Zip-
code centroids seems to give a good approximation to the actual farm
network.
Notice how the respective numbers of the three spatial units differ
by about one order of magnitude: speciﬁcally, from 7043 farms to 805
ZIP codes we have about one-ninth as many spatial units, and fromFig. 7. Attack rates of the fraction of units (farms, ZIP codes, or805 ZIP codes to 67 counties we have about one-twelfth as many
spatial units. The distribution of the sizes of the spatial units, in terms
of number of birds each contains, is quite unequal at each spatial level.
There are very many units with few birds and very few units with
many birds. To illustrate: the largest farm contains as many birds as
the 6055 smallest farms; the largest ZIP code contains as many birds
as the 681 smallest ZIP codes; the largest county contains as many
birds as the 61 smallest counties; and the largest 3 counties contain
more birds than the rest of the state combined.Our epidemic data
To see the effect of these different spatial scales on our epidemic
simulations, we ﬁrst chose epidemic parameters of δ=5.8×10−5 and
ρ=2.50 that we derived from our Method 2 of a previous paper
(Rorres et al., 2010) using data from the 1983–84 AVI epidemic in
Pennsylvania (Buisch et al., 1984). We then ran 1000 control
simulations on the farm level beginning with the index farm shown
in Fig. 2. The top parts of Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 display various aspects of the
resulting farm-level simulations. In Fig. 6, the top left graph shows the
bird attack rates of the 1000 simulations. By the bird attack rate of an
epidemic wemean the fraction of birds in Pennsylvania (including the
birds of the index farm) that were infected during the epidemic. Thecounties) infected over 1000 simulated control epidemics.
Fig. 8. Plots of the numbers of newly infectious birds (left) or units (right) for the three levels (farm, ZIP code, or county) as a function of time. These values were averages over the
severe epidemics out of 1000 control simulations.
Fig. 9. Each of the 7043 poultry farms is shaded according to the number of times that it was infected in the severe control epidemics among the 1000 simulated.
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Fig. 10. Each of the 805 ZIP codes is shaded according to the number of times that any farm within it was infected in the severe control epidemics among the 1000 simulated.
67C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70top-left graph displays these 1000 attack rates along the vertical axis
sorted along the horizontal axis according to magnitude.
From the 1000 simulated epidemics run on the farm level, we then
surmised what the bird attack rates on the ZIP code and county levels
would be for the same 1000 epidemics as follows: as soon as any farm
in a ZIP code or county was infected (passed into the Exposed or
Latent stage) in a single epidemic, we considered the entire ZIP code
or county to be exposed from that time step and to remain exposed for
the assumed latent period, then become infectious for the assumed
infectious period, then become recovered. These computations
generated the second and third rows of Fig. 6 that show the bird
attack rates for the ZIP-code and county levels, as indicated on the
graphs.
Fig. 7 is analogous to Fig. 6, displaying the unit attack rates of the
1000 epidemics rather than the bird attack rates. By the unit attack
rate of an epidemic we mean the fraction of spatial units (i.e., farms,
ZIP codes, or counties) that are infected during an epidemic.
All three histograms in Fig. 7 show a bimodal distribution with a
clear separation between the peaks on the farm and ZIP-code
histograms. On the farm level we labeled an epidemic as mild if it
belonged with the left peak in the top histogram of Fig. 7 (529
epidemics) and severe if it belonged with the right peak (471Fig. 11. Each of the 67 counties is shaded according to the number of times that any farmepidemics). The same criterion on the ZIP-code level resulted in the
same epidemics as being either mild or severe. On the county level,
however, the bottom histogram of Fig. 7 does not have a clear
separation between its two peaks, and so we arbitrarily chose those
epidemics to the left of the low point as mild (507 epidemics) and the
remainder as severe (493 epidemics).
Fig. 8 displays a bar chart of the average, over the severe epidemics
out of 1000 simulations, of the number of newly infectious birds (left)
or spatial units (right) in each of the time steps for the three spatial
levels. Recall that the time step was one day on the farm level, ﬁve
days on the ZIP-code level, and ten days on the county level. A ZIP
code or county was counted as being newly infected in the time step
in which any farm within it was ﬁrst infected. Notice that the newly
infected spatial unit charts on the right always start with one since
only the one index farm is newly infected in the ﬁrst time step.
All three bar charts exhibit the characteristic behavior of such
epidemic curves: they build up to a peak rather quickly and then
slowly drop down to zero. The peaks, however, are reached sooner as
the spatial units increase in size.
Figs. 9-11 display: another important evaluation of an epidemic:
the probability that a particular spatial unit will be infected for a given
index unit. In each of the threemaps of Pennsylvania, each spatial unitwithin it was infected in the severe control epidemics among the 1000 simulated.
Table 1
Sample means of the maximum likelihood estimates of the system parameters δ and ρ
for the three spatial scales.
δ ρ
Farm level 6.9×10−5 2.55
ZIP-code level 7.4×10−8 1.59
County level 4.5×10−5 2.73
68 C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70is shaded according to the fraction of times it was one of the infected
units among the severe epidemics. On the farm level, sizes of the farm
disks are also drawn in one of three sizes according to their probability
of being infected.
Notice that many of the ZIP codes (Fig. 10) and counties (Fig. 11)
are shaded white, indicating that these spatial units were never
infected in any of the severe epidemics among the 1000 simulated.
Mathematically speaking, however, every spatial unit has a nonzero
probability of being infected in one time step if any other spatial unit
is infectious in that time step.
Our estimated epidemic parameters
A good test of how much information is lost by collecting data on
larger spatial scales is how well the epidemic parameters estimated
from such data model ongoing or future epidemics. We previously
considered the question of parameter estimation (Rorres et al., 2010),
but only for data collected on the farm level. We considered three
differentmethods for determining the parameters depending onwhat
data were collected. Here we will only apply one of the methods, the
most accurate one, which is a maximum likelihood estimation. The
method requires that we know which units were infectious in each
time step and which susceptible units were and were not infected
within each time step. When this amount of data is available, a
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the epidemic parameters
can be formulated.
To describe this estimation technique, let A(k), as before, be the set
of indices of those units that were infectious at the beginning of the
kth time step, k=1, 2, …, K, where K is the last time step for which
data were collected. Usually, K is the last time step of a completed
epidemic, but it could also be the present time step of an ongoing
epidemic. Next, let B(k) and C(k) be the sets of indices of the
susceptible units that were and were not infected during the kth time
step, respectively. Then for a given pair of values of δ and ρ the
probability L(δ,ρ) of the observed pattern of infectious, non-infected,
and newly infected units over the K time steps, based on our
probabilistic model of the spread of the epidemic, is
L δ; ρð Þ = ∏
K
k=1
∏
j∈B kð Þ
Pjk δ;ρð Þ
" #
∏
j∈C kð Þ
1−Pjk δ;ρð Þ
 " #( )
ð6Þ
where Pjk δ,ρ) is as deﬁned in Eq. (5). Then, by deﬁnition, the
maximum likelihood estimates for δ and ρ are those values for which
L(δ,ρ) is maximized.
In Fig. 12 we display these epidemic-parameter estimates for the
three spatial scales for some of the control epidemics of the previousFig. 12. The maximum likelihood estimates of the epidemic parameters δ and ρ for
some of the 1000 simulated control epidemics for the three spatial scales. The estimates
for the three spatial scales form three arcs and their sample means are indicated by the
circles.section. We used 749 of the control epidemics for the farm-level
estimates, 421 for the ZIP-code level estimates, and 451 for the
county-level estimates.We discarding those control epidemics at each
level that did not converge using a MATLAB™ program for
maximizing L(δ,ρ), usually because the epidemics were too mild to
yield acceptable results.
The large circles are the sample means of the three sets of
estimates and their numerical values are given in Table 1.We used the
arithmetic mean of the ρ estimates and the geometric mean of the δ
estimates.
Because the epidemics from which the MLE estimates were
derived were generated from our mathematical model on the farm
level using the epidemic parameters δ=5.8×10−5 and ρ=2.50, it
is no surprise that the sample means of the farm-level estimates
are reasonably close to the original values. The estimated
parameters on the ZIP-code and county levels, however, need not
be expected to match the farm-level estimates since different time
steps are used for those two levels. What we expect of these
estimates is that when inserted into the mathematical model, the
resulting simulations will have properties similar to those
described in Figs. 6 and 7.
Fig. 13 displays four graphs that illustrate the behavior of our
model on the farm level using the two farm-level parameter estimates
in Table 1. The two top graphs of the bird attack rates of 1000
simulations are analogous to the two top graphs of Fig. 7. The
agreement is excellent, although the jump in Fig. 7 occurs at 0.529
while it is at 0.622 in Fig. 13. Thus the estimated parameters yield a
model in which there are fewer severe epidemics than among the
control simulations.
The bottom two graphs in Fig. 13 compare very well with their
respective analogs of the top-right graph of Fig. 8 (expected daily
newly infectious farms of severe epidemics) and Fig. 9 (probability of
infection by farm for severe epidemics). All of this is in agreement
with our previous conclusions (Rorres et al., 2010) about the accuracy
of this method for estimating the two epidemic parameters.
Fig. 14 shows four graphs that describe the typical behavior of
epidemics generated by using the ZIP-code level geographical data
and the ZIP-code level MLE estimates of δ and ρ in Table 1. The two top
graphs of the bird attack rates of 1000 simulations are analogous to
the twomiddle graphs of Fig. 7. The agreement is again excellent, with
a jump in the farm attack rate occurring at 0.529 among the 1000
control epidemics and at 0.457 among the 1000 simulations shown in
the top-left graph of Fig. 14.
As with Fig. 13, the bottom two graphs in Fig. 14 compare very well
with their respective analogs of the middle-right graph of Fig. 8
(expected daily newly infectious farms of severe epidemics) and
Fig. 10 (probability of infection by farm for severe epidemics).
Fig. 15 displays the graphs associated with collected data on the
county level and using the analogous county-level mathematical
model. Because there are only 67 counties, the results were much
cruder than on the farm and ZIP-code levels. We needed to run
100,000 simulated epidemics, rather than 1000, to get a reasonable
number of epidemics in which the epidemic spread outside of the
index county. Speciﬁcally, of 100,000 simulated epidemics 97,661
did not spread beyond the index county, 2330 spread to one other
county, 149 spread to two other counties, and 7 spread to three
other counties. Of the 67 counties in Pennsylvania, only 7 other
Fig. 13. Epidemic graphs using the farm-level model and the MLE estimates for the parameters.
69C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70than the index county were ever infected among the 100,000
simulations. Consequently, the epidemic parameters determined by
the 1000 control epidemics did not generate epidemics consistent
with the control epidemics themselves. Thus with an ongoing
epidemic for which only county-level data is collected, our model
cannot be expected to accurately predict the future course of the
epidemic.Fig. 14. Epidemic graphs using the ZIP-code level mDiscussion
Our objective was to see how epidemics simulated on the farm,
ZIP-code, and county levels behave. We generated a set of 1000
simulated control epidemics on the farm level using a speciﬁc set of
epidemic parameters and then examined them on the three spatial
levels. We then estimated the epidemic parameters on the threeodel and the MLE estimates for the parameters.
Fig. 15. Epidemic graphs using the county-level model and the MLE estimates for the parameters.
70 C. Rorres et al. / Epidemics 3 (2011) 61–70spatial levels and generated more epidemics at the various levels to
see how they compare with the control epidemics.
The results, as displayed in Figs. 13–15, suggest that aggregating
the farms within ZIP codes produces results as good as those in which
the farms are not aggregated. Going from 7043 farms to 805 ZIP codes
seems to preserve those features of an epidemic that are useful for the
development of vaccination or culling strategies to prevent or control
an ongoing or future epidemic.
However, aggregating the farms within 67 county units did not
produce satisfactory results. The simulated epidemics that arose when
inserting the MLE estimates for the epidemic parameters did not
display the characteristics of the farm-level epidemics. Apparently the
dynamics of an epidemic within a county are too important to simply
describe as one in which all of the farms are simultaneously in a latent
stage followed abruptly by an infectious stage. Too much of the
spatial detail of our model is lost when only 67 spatial units are
considered. It appears that modelers must have data available at
least on the ZIP-code level, and ideally on the farm level, to
realistically deal with future or ongoing epidemics using modern
stochastic, spatial models.
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